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I N T O E X I L E
Italy was not the only region of Western Europe in which there were political exiles in the later ®fteenth century. When Henry VI¯ed to Scotland after the defeat of his supporters at the battle of Towton in March 1461, he was not unusual among the English kings of the ®f-teenth century in having personal experience of exile.`His grandfather [Henry IV] had won the kingdom from exile; Henry's successor [Edward IV] was to recover it from exile. Starting out from exile . . . his nephew, Henry Tudor, was likewise to secure a kingdom for himself in 1485.' 1 The future Louis XI of France took refuge at the court of the Duke of Burgundy in 1456, and he did not return to France until he came to take possession of the French throne in 1461 after his father's death. But if the highest in the land knew exile in England and France, as some members of Italian ruling families did, there do not seem to have been the equivalents there of the exiles from civic strife that were so common in Italy. Towns in England, France and Spain, even the great cities of the Low Countries, did not have the degree or type of political independence that gave rise to the kind of contest for power that resulted in the exile of political opponents. The Imperial cities of the Holy Roman Empire had greater autonomy and powers of self-government. Although only a few had their own territories, like the contado so jealously guarded by Italian towns and cities, some could appear familiar political entities to Italian travellers. The city of Ulm, for instance, was described by one traveller from Italy as`a big town, governed as a free republic, rich and full of merchants'.
2 Civic strife and contests for power in such cities could result in the exile of the vanquished. One such exile was the pioneer printer Johann Gutenberg, who was banished twice, for long periods, from his native city of Mainz.
Nevertheless, nowhere else in Western Europe could rival Italy for the sheer numbers of political exiles. In Italy, it was not just men wielding power in large, rich cities governing extensive territories, independent republics such as Florence or Venice, who considered that they had the right to exile their political rivals. Men in towns subject to such cities, or to a prince, men in backwoods communities that had little to ®ght over but the meagre fruits of of®ce or the exploitation of communal property, might also consider that they had the legal power to expel their rivals. The fragmentation of political authority in mediaeval Italy had meant that many towns, not just the great merchant cities, had come to see themselves as autonomous political entities, and the patterns of thought and behaviour that had developed in the turbulence of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries persisted, even when such towns had fallen under the domination of a larger neighbour or of a prince. The tradition that those who held power in a commune had the right to exclude and expel their rivals was widespread and ®rmly rooted (even if it might be contested, in the case of subject towns, by their superiors). If political differences appeared irreconcilable, not amenable to compromise, the exile of those worsted in the contest was the usual way of removing them from the scene. Long-term imprisonment was rare in Renaissance Italy. Locking up large numbers of political opponents for lengthy periods was not an option, though small groups might be incarcerated by a con®dent regime with secure prisons at its disposal. Political executions of those found guilty of political crimes were infrequent too, and regarded as shocking, unless it was for an act such as an assassination attempt. Political executions for which there was less obvious justi®cation were regarded as vindictive, and harmed the reputation of a regime at home and abroad. Exiling political opponents might be regarded as injudicious, or even in some cases unjust, but would not attract anything like the same adverse comment.
There were exiles from independent republics and from subject towns, from the kingdom of Naples and from other signorie, large and small. There were disgraced courtiers, members of ruling families, the leaders and the foot-soldiers of urban factions, sober professional men who had been defeated in political disputes, men who had contravened the rules governing elections to political of®ce in their city, men who had tried to assassinate their rivals. Within this varied multitude, four broad categories of exiles can be distinguished. The ®rst comprised the members of ruling or at least dominant families, who were the losers in dynastic quarrels. Some were expelled by their rivals, some by other powers ± intervention by Italian states in the dynastic disputes of their neighbours was a frequent occurrence, and required little excuse other than self-interest. Opponents of such dynasties, who rebelled against them or challenged their rule, formed the second category; those who contested the policies or structure of republican government the third. The fourth, the most numerous, was those who had been defeated in struggles between political factions. Not all exiles fall neatly into one or other of these categories, as we shall see, but they do provide some help in understanding the circumstances in which so many ®fteenth-century Italians were forced into political exile.
Exiles who fell into the ®rst category included some of the most prominent individuals who found themselves in that predicament in ®fteenth-century Italy. A future Duke of Milan, more than one King of Naples, several past or future Doges of Genoa, members of several signorial families, all spent some time in exile. The uncertain legitimacy of the position of many ruling families, the lack of ®xed rules of succession, a disposition to regard states as a kind of family property which could be divided up among family members, all contributed to the stock of banished aspiring or deposed signori, of various degrees of power and rank. The French invasions of Italy in 1494 and 1499±1500 were the cause, direct or indirect, of the exile of many more.
The reluctance by younger brothers to accept the right of the eldest to be sole ruler of the state was the root of the disputes that wracked the Sforza dynasty in Milan in the late 1470s and early 1480s, and led to the exile of several of its members. Galeazzo Maria, the eldest legitimate son, who succeeded his father Francesco as duke in 1466, relished his role as prince of one of the most powerful states of Italy. Two of his brothers, Sforza Maria and Lodovico, may have conspired to kill him. In November 1476, a few months after this plot was supposed to have been hatched, they were sent to France. Galeazzo Maria claimed that they were going of their own accord, because they wanted to`see the world', but it was clear that they were, in effect, going into exile.
3
Within days of their arrival at the French court, on 26 December 1476, Galeazzo Maria was assassinated by a group of young Milanese patricians. Sforza Maria and Lodovico immediately returned to Milan. There Galeazzo Maria's widow Bona had assumed the regency for her young son Giangaleazzo Maria, and she was supported by Cicco Simonetta, the powerful ducal secretary. Even before the Sforza brothers returned from France, a conspiracy was brewing in Milan to make Sforza Maria head of the government, if not duke; but the arrest of one of the leading conspirators, Ettore da Vimercate, put an end to that design. The Sforza brothers claimed that Francesco had never intended that Galeazzo Maria should rule alone, but that they all should have had a share in the government. They came to terms with Bona, promising to live in Milan, although she really wanted them to leave and tried to arrange this by asking Milan's allies to give them condotte.
4
It was Cicco Simonetta who brought matters to a head by ordering the arrest of a veteran condottiere of the Sforza, Donato del Conte, who was alleged to know all about the conspiracy against him and the duchess. The brothers Sforza Maria, Lodovico, Ottaviano and Ascanio, together with their cousin Roberto da Sanseverino, mustered what forces they could and tried to arouse the people, but met with little response. Sforza Maria, Lodovico and Ascanio submitted, while Ottaviano, the youngest brother, panicked and¯ed, drowning as he tried to ford the River Adda. Roberto, whom Bona treated as the main conspirator, a disloyal ingrate who had suborned her brothers-in-law, alsō ed. He was condemned as a rebel; the three surviving Sforza brothers who had taken part in the rising were ordered into exile. They returned home in 1479: a combination of Roberto da Sanseverino's military skills and support for the brothers in Milan and elsewhere in the duchy brought about the submission of several towns to them, and induced Bona to negotiate. Sforza Maria had died suddenly during the campaign, but Lodovico and Roberto were back in Milan in September 1479, and Ascanio joined them the following month.
5
Three days after Lodovico came back, Cicco Simonetta was arrested; he was executed a year later. The power struggle at the Milanese court is dif®cult to decipher, but Lodovico was the undoubted victor. Ascanio, who also aspired to a role in the government, was sent into exile again in early March 1480, accused of intriguing with the leaders of the Ghibellines in Milan and with the Neapolitan ambassador. In October, Lodovico was involved in manoeuvres that separated the young duke from his mother, and forced her to agree to the immediate exile of her favourite, Antonio Tassini, and his father from the duchy for ten years. The departure of Tassini and the loss of custody of her son left Bona desperate. She declared her intention of leaving Milan: she had thought of returning to her family in Savoy, but she was compelled to go to the castle of Abbiategrasso and to stay there.
6
Lodovico was now the dominant member of the government in Milan, but he was still not the undisputed master. Roberto da Sanseverino, for one, was an in¯uential ®gure, but he became increasingly estranged from Lodovico. He felt slighted and sidelined, but the last straw seems to have been when his pay as a condottiere began to fall into arrears. In October 1481 he left Milan for his castle at Castelnuovo. In January 1482 he was given an ultimatum: either he came to Milan within two days, or he must leave the duchy. When he did not come, troops were sent against him, and in early February he escaped into exile.
7 Ascanio Sforza came back to Milan in September 1482. He was given an honourable role in the government, but one clearly subordinate to that of Lodovico. The diplomatic pressure Lodovico brought to bear on the pope, which ®nally procured a cardinal's hat for Ascanio in March 1484, had a dual motive. It secured a position of honour and inuence for his brother, and it provided a good reason to send him away from Milan.
8
The d'Este of Ferrara had been established as a ruling family for much longer than the Sforza, but no rules of succession had become ®xed. Niccolo Á d'Este, just before his death in 1441, ordered that he should be succeeded by his natural sons Lionello and Borso, with his much younger legitimate son, Ercole, being placed only third in line. On Lionello's death in 1450, he was duly succeeded by Borso, but Lionello's young son Niccolo Á grew up believing that he, not Ercole, should be Borso's heir. As Borso lay gravely ill in the summer of 1471, Ercole and Niccolo Á squared up to dispute the succession. Ercole had the support of Venice, Niccolo Á of his mother's family, the Gonzaga of Mantua. When Borso died, Ercole waited until Venetian ships had reached Ferrara along the Po before proclaiming the death of the duke and his own succession. Niccolo Á and his Gonzaga relatives could do nothing, and he 6 Santoro, Gli Sforza, pp. 216±26; Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, vol. I had to stay in exile in Mantua, where he had been sent by Borso. He tried to depose Ercole in September 1476 but found little support in the city, and was captured and executed. Another member of his family to cause Ercole concern was his half-brother Alfonso. Alfonso had supported Ercole when he took power in 1471, and his only offence may have been his personal popularity in Ferrara. Nevertheless, Ercole sent him into exile in 1474, and despite further proofs of his loyalty, Alberto was kept away from Ferrara for a decade.
9
In the case of two old-established families of Romagnol signori, the Ordelaf® and Manfredi, family quarrels and succession disputes not only led to exile for some members of the families, but also provided openings for an ambitious papal nipote, Girolamo Riario, to take over their states.
It was another will stipulating the succession of one brother to another that was at the root of the dispute among the Manfredi of Faenza in the 1470s. By the terms of their father's will, Galeotto Manfredi was to succeed his brother Carlo as signore of Faenza, but they quarrelled and Galeotto and another brother, Lanzalotto, were sent away from Faenza in 1476. By late 1477 Carlo was very ill, and on 2 October a fourth brother, Federico, who was Bishop of Faenza and had been acting as Carlo's lieutenant, made the Faentini swear fealty to Ottaviano, Carlo's young son, as his heir. A ®rst attempt by Galeotto to return failed in October, but a second attempt on 16 November, the day after a popular uprising against grain speculation by Federico, was successful, and Galeotto was greeted rapturously by the Faentini. He also had troops from Girolamo Riario, Pino Ordelaf® of Forlõ Á, Bologna and Venice to back him up. Carlo and Federico, who had retreated to the fortress in the city, sent to Naples for help. King Ferrante sent 40 squadrons to Fano, and tried to negotiate an agreement to keep Carlo in power. As Florence and Milan also decided to back Galeotto, Ferrante had to yield. When no help arrived from Ferrante, Carlo surrendered on 9 December, and left for Ferrara and then for Naples; Federico had already¯ed.
10
Exploitation by Galeazzo Maria Sforza of a family dispute among another branch of the Manfredi resulted in their exile and the loss of Forlõ Á came into the hands of Girolamo Riario because of a family quarrel among the Ordelaf®. In 1468 Cecco Ordelaf® had been ousted, imprisoned and murdered by his brother Pino, with whom he had shared the lordship of Forlõ Á. Cecco's wife and children managed to escape from prison into exile after his death. Pino died in 1480, leaving a natural son, Sinibaldo, who was only about twelve years old, to succeed him. Cecco's sons, Antonio Maria and Francesco, were invited by the people of Forlõ Á to come to take over the signoria. They arrived in Forlõ Á on 8 July and immediately took possession of the town, but the citadel was held by Sinibaldo and his stepmother. The brothers' success brought them covert encouragement and the prospect of help from Florence and Milan, but neither power was willing to commit itself too openly to them for fear of offending Pope Sixtus IV, Girolamo Riario's uncle. Riario wanted Forlõ Á for himself; Ferrante of Naples and, more reluctantly, Milan and Florence agreed to this as part of the complex series of negotiations being carried on among the Italian powers that summer. When the Duke of Urbino arrived with troops on behalf of the pope in early August, sent reinforcements into the fortress and called on the citizens to choose whom they would support, they decided they had, perforce, to submit to the pope. The Ordelaf® brothers left, and a week later Sinibaldo Ordelaf® died, apparently from natural causes, although there were inevitable rumours of foul play. The way was clear for Girolamo Riario to be invested with the signoria of Forlõ Á. Elsewhere in the Papal States, Niccolo Á Vitelli's attempt to establish himself as the unof®cial signore of Citta Á di Castello cost him years in exile, not least because his ousted rivals found favour in Rome. In April 1468, while the papal governor was absent, Niccolo Á secretly brought two hundred peasants into Citta Á di Castello and attacked the houses of his rivals the Fucci and Giustini, several of whom were killed. Those who escaped the slaughter took their complaints to Rome, where Amadeo Giustini and his son Lorenzo had the ear of Pope Paul II. The pope sent a legate to order Niccolo Á either to appear before him or to leave Citta Á di Castello and stay at least ®fty miles away. Niccolo Á refused to do either. Finally, an embassy from the city, which included Niccolo Á's son Giovanni, went to the pope in February 1470, and came to terms with him.
13
Lorenzo Giustini continued to ®nd favour under the new pope, Sixtus IV, and soon became attached to Girolamo Riario. Sixtus declared his intention of ensuring that Niccolo Á lived as a citizen and not as a signore. In late June 1474 a papal army led by another nipote of Sixtus, Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, arrived before Citta Á di Castello. After a siege lasting two months, Niccolo Á agreed to leave Citta Á di Castello with his family, and stay at least ®fteen miles away; he departed on 31 August. According to the terms of his surrender, Lorenzo Giustini and his father Amedeo were not to be allowed to stay in Citta Á di Castello either, although the other exiles would be.
14 Niccolo Á enjoyed the protection of Florence, where his friends and contacts included the Medici. In June 1482, when Florence and the pope were at war, a substantial force of Florentine troops was sent to restore the Vitelli to Citta Á di Castello. Even before they arrived, Niccolo Á had appeared at the gates of the city with a large number of partisans and infantry and had been welcomed in. When negotiations opened between the pope and the league of Florence, Milan and Naples in late 1482, the fate of the Vitelli and Citta Á di Castello was one of the more dif®cult issues under debate. It was rendered more dif®cult by the fact that the envoy negotiating for the pope in Naples, where the talks were taking place, was Lorenzo Giustini. In February 1483, the Florentines were forced to concede that Niccolo Á Vitelli and his family should leave. A campaign against Citta Á di Castello was launched by papal troops in June, with Lorenzo Giustini as one of the commanders. The capture of Niccolo Á's son Camillo in January 1484 at last induced him to think of surrendering, and in early April he left for Rome to come to terms with the pope. He had to agree to go into exile where the pope ordered, and that Sixtus should make provision for the safety of Lorenzo Giustini. But Niccolo Á himself was given an appointment as papal governor of the Campagna and Marittima, and his four sons were given papal condotte.
15
In August 1485, there was a formal peace-making between the factions in Citta Á di Castello, and in September Niccolo Á was allowed to return there. After his death in January 1486, his sons succeeded to his position of superiority in the city. One of them, Paolo, took revenge on Lorenzo Giustini, who had remained in Rome, by murdering him in October 1487. Paolo was condemned to death, but then Innocent VIII commuted the sentence to ten years' exile ± meaning exile from Rome, not from Citta Á di Castello.
16
In Genoa the of®ce of Doge, head of the republic, was disputed by members of one family, the Campofregoso, both among themselves and with their rivals, the Adorno. In theory, Doges (who had to be popolari, not nobles) were elected for life; in practice, Doges came to power after faction-®ghting or as the outcome of (often obscure) power-broking. Members of both the Adorno and the Campofregoso, the defeated or the disgruntled, spent many years in exile, and rarely stayed in of®ce more than a few years.
In the middle of the ®fteenth century it was the Campofregoso who were dominant in Genoa. In September 1450, Pietro Campofregoso was elected Doge to succeed another member of the family, Lodovico, who had been deposed. Pietro managed to survive as Doge for eight years ± which was no mean achievement ± but his dictatorial ways soon made him unpopular. Among the enemies he made were several of his relatives. One, Niccolo Á, he assassinated himself in May 1452, with the help of Niccolo Á's brother Spinetta, only to lose the support of Spinetta 18 months later. Spinetta left Genoa to join the exiles, as Niccolo Á's sons had done after their father's death.
17
The Doge also had an enemy in King Alfonso of Naples, who was 15 Nicasi,`La famiglia Vitelli', 149±53, 157±8, 161±8, 222±33, 237±8. 16 Ibid., 168±71. 17 ASMi, ASforzesco, bb. 407±9; for accounts of Genoese politics and the activities of the exiles using this material see Adriana Sambati,`I carteggi diplomatici sforzeschi relativi alla serie Genova (1450±1454)', ASL 98±100 (1971±3), 159±207; Chiara Prandini,`I carteggi diplomatici sforzeschi relativi alla serie Genova (1450±1454) 
18
In March 1461, the people of Genoa revolted, the exiles returned, and immediately the Adorno and Campofregoso began a contest for the Dogeship. A peace was negotiated between Prospero Adorno and Archbishop Paolo Campofregoso, and on 12 March Prospero Adorno was elected Doge with the agreement of the archbishop. When Charles VII sent a¯eet against Genoa in early July, among those who fought hard in the battle to defeat the French were several Campofregoso. As they arrived back at Genoa`all bloody, sweaty and exhausted by such a cruel and ®erce battle', Prospero Adorno sent to tell them not to enter the city. Naturally, the Campofregoso were not prepared to obey, and they were the victors in the ensuing street ®ght; Prospero Adorno hastily departed.
19 Dissension and competition among the Campofregoso continued, with Paolo and Lodovico alternating as Doge for the next three years.
Negotiating the peaceful submission of Genoa to Milanese rule after Louis XI had formally invested Francesco Sforza with Genoa as a ®ef of the French crown in December 1463 was a delicate matter, not least because the incumbent Doge, Paolo Campofregoso, was very reluctant to relinquish his of®ce. As the Milanese occupied more of the Riviera, and the other Campofregoso refused to put aside their quarrels and unite behind him, he at last decided to go, leaving by sea on the night of 24±5 March 1464. 20 The Genoese seemed to settle down under the rule of Francesco Sforza and, when he died in March 1466, accepted Galeazzo Maria without hesitation.
By their standards, the Genoese proved remarkably patient under Galeazzo Maria's government. But after his assassination in December 1476 weakened the Milanese government, the Fieschi, the powerful noble family, gathered their forces and entered Genoa in March 1477, routing the Milanese troops there. Other faction leaders, including Paolo Campofregoso, hurried to the city. Members of the Adorno faction offered their support to the Milanese if Prospero Adorno was released from the fortress of Cremona, where he had been imprisoned. Prospero was freed, and joined the Milanese troops being despatched to put down the rebellion. As he neared the city, two thousand partisans came to join him, and on 11 April marched on Genoa with him. After ®erce ®ghting, he defeated Paolo Campofregoso and Obietto, the leader of the Fieschi, and entered Genoa in triumph, becoming not Doge, but governor on behalf of Milan.
21
By early 1478 the Milanese wanted to dismiss him from the governorship, but Prospero forestalled this move, and with the backing of the popolo became the independent governor of Genoa. The Milanese tried to recover Genoa through the return of another exile, Battista Campofregoso, son of the former Doge Pietro, promising to recognize him as Doge if he could procure his own election. Battista returned to Genoa in October 1478; the Milanese troops still occupying the fortresses in Genoa surrendered them to him. When the Campofregoso brought their men out onto the streets on 25 November, Prospero Adorno abandoned the palace without a ®ght, and left for exile again. Three days later, Battista Campofregoso was elected Doge. While af®rming his loyalty to Milan, Battista informed the Milanese of his determination to preserve the independence of Genoa. He seems to have shared his power with other Campofregoso; but in November 1483 he was deposed by his own family and faction. His deposition caused no trouble: it was regarded almost as a private matter of the Campofregoso. He was replaced as Doge by Paolo Campofregoso, who since 1480 had been a cardinal as well as Archbishop of Genoa.
22 Battista went into exile, nursing schemes to revenge himself.
Paolo Campofregoso was unable to hold on to power for more than a few years. In order to try to conserve his position, he was prepared to submit Genoa to Milan again; Lodovico Sforza was more than ready to accept and terms were agreed in July 1487. Obietto opposition to the cardinal) and with Battista Campofregoso, still hungry for revenge against his uncle. In early August 1488, Battista Campofregoso and the Fieschi came to the city with armed men, and the cardinal ed to the main fortress, the Castelletto, pursued by Battista. Agostino and Giovanni Adorno also returned, warmly welcomed by their supporters.
23 Some Genoese wanted to be under Milan, some under France; some wanted to be independent. At last it was agreed that Battista Campofregoso would have to return to exile, and that Genoa should once more be ruled by Milan, on the same terms as before. On 11 September, Agostino Adorno was appointed governor of Genoa for Milan. He and his brother Giovanni remained in power until the downfall of Lodovico Sforza in 1499 brought about their own, and the surrender of Genoa to the French. Cardinal Paolo Campofregoso had ®nally left for exile in Rome in October 1488, after some hard bargaining; he died in Rome in 1498.
The French invasions of Naples and Milan that began in 1494 brought a spate of exiles from ruling or dominant families, affecting four of the ®ve major Italian states. The expulsions of the Sforza from Milan and of the Aragonese kings from Naples were the direct result ± and aim ± of French military action; in the case of King Federico, of Spanish military action as well. French troops assisted papal troops commanded by Cesare Borgia to drive the Riario from Imola and Forlõ Á. Dominant families exiled as an indirect consequence of the French invasions were the Medici from Florence, and the barons and signori left exposed to the ambitions of the Borgia by the disruption wrought by the invasions on the systems of patronage and protection that had linked them to other Italian powers.
Two of the last three kings of the Neapolitan branch of the Aragonese dynasty, Alfonso II and his brother Federico, died in exile; the third, Alfonso's son Ferrandino, spent some of his short reign in exile too. As the long-threatened invasion by Charles VIII became a reality in late 1494, Alfonso, aware of his unpopularity with his subjects, lost his nerve. When he heard that Charles had crossed the border into his kingdom, he resigned the throne to his son Ferrandino on 23 January 1495. Ten days later he left for self-imposed exile, taking with him the treasure Ferrandino needed to confront the invaders.
24 He died in exile in Sicily in December 1495. Although Ferrandino was as beloved by his subjects as his father was loathed, they still had no stomach to ®ght the French on his behalf. Soon nearly all the kingdom was in the hands of the French. Ferrandino was offered estates in France as compensation, but he was ready to ®ght to regain his kingdom and he went to Sicily to gather forces. Even before Charles had begun his journey back to France in May 1495, Ferrandino was recovering territory in Calabria, helped in his reconquest by Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, and by his Italian allies. There were setbacks. After one defeat, Ferrandino retired brie¯y to Sicily again, before returning with a Spanish¯eet. He died in October 1496, and was succeeded by his uncle Federico, who had to face another French invasion.
25
Charles VIII's successor, Louis XII, was determined to enforce the claim to Naples that he had inherited with the French crown. As the French army reached Rome on its way to Naples in June 1501, Alexander VI declared Federico to be deposed from the throne and sanctioned the plan agreed between France and Spain the previous year in the Treaty of Granada, to divide the kingdom between them. Under cover of coming to the aid of Federico, the Spanish monarchs were able to position their troops to take over their share of the kingdom. The discovery of the treachery of his Spanish relatives caused Federico to resign himself to his fate. Preferring to yield to the French rather than the Spanish, he made a truce with them on 25 July, surrendering to them the half of the kingdom assigned to Louis by the Treaty of Granada. On 6 September Federico embarked for an honourable but closely watched exile in France.
duchy. Captured, he was taken to France, and died a prisoner there in May 1508. Those of his supporters who would not return to Milan and submit to Louis were condemned as rebels. Ascanio, who had been captured on the same day as his brother, by the Venetian allies of the French, was also taken to France and imprisoned. 27 The powerful French cardinal Georges d'Amboise, the leading minister of Louis, sought to obtain credit in Rome by having him released in 1502.
Among the ®rst to be driven into exile as an indirect consequence of the French invasion in 1494 were the sons of Lorenzo de' Medici. After the death of Lorenzo in April 1492, his eldest son Piero soon showed that he lacked his father's ®ne political skills. His arrogant and lordly ways offended his fellow citizens. His persistence in his support for Alfonso, when Charles VIII was calling on the Florentines to stand by their traditional friendship with France, came to seem to many Florentines not only misguided but dangerous. As the French army was approaching Florence, Piero left to go to see Charles, but without an of®cial mandate to negotiate. Charles was pitching his demands very high, but Piero, when he ®nally met the king personally, conceded everything. His capitulation to Charles heightened the anger and hostility felt by many even of the former supporters of the Medici. On 9 November, the day after he returned to Florence, Piero tried to enter the Palace of the Signoria. He insisted that his armed escort should go in with him, and this was refused. Rather than go in without them, Piero turned back and went home. This incident was later presented as an attempt to take the Palace by force. That evening, perhaps after hearing reports of plans to declare him a rebel, Piero¯ed from Florence, followed by his younger brothers, Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano. Several of Piero's closest associates sought safety in¯ight too.
28
Political changes brought about in Italy by the intervention of the French were fatal to several signorial dynasties in the Papal States, once Alexander VI had set his sights on creating a duchy of Romagna for his son Cesare. Signorial families had been accustomed to looking for support and protection to Florence, Milan, Naples or Venice. But by late 1499, while the forces of the papacy were strengthened by the alliance of Alexander with Louis XII, the Sforza had been removed by the French conquest of the duchy of Milan, Federico of Naples faced the prospect of the loss of his own kingdom, the Florentines were preoccupied with their own political upheavals, and the Venetians were preoccupied with the threat from the Turks to their overseas empire, as well as bound by an alliance with Louis.
French troops helped Cesare Borgia take Forlõ Á and Imola from Girolamo Riario's widow, Caterina, in December 1499. She had already sent her children to safety in Florence, where she joined them in exile after eighteen months of imprisonment in Rome. In October 1500 it was the turn of Giovanni Sforza of Pesaro to be driven out; the Manfredi of Faenza followed, after six months of resistance. Cesare then turned to Tuscany, where Piombino fell to his troops in July 1501, sending Jacopo d'Appiano into exile. The following year a surprise attack on the duchy of Urbino sent Guidobaldo da Montefeltro to join the other deposed papal vicars in exile in Venice. Giulio Cesare Varano of Camerino, who had given refuge to exiles from several places in the Papal States, was the next to lose his state. Urbino and Camerino were brie¯y lost to the Borgia when Cesare's Italian condottieri, several of whom feared for their own security, rebelled against him. After an ostensible reconciliation with them, and the recovery of Urbino and Camerino, Cesare attacked and took Senigallia, whose vicar was Francesco Maria della Rovere. The fall of Senigallia was accompanied by Cesare Borgia's famous coup against his condottieri. One of those strangled at Senigallia was Vitellozzo Vitelli; all the remaining Vitelli departed from Citta Á da Castello a few days later, before Cesare's army arrived to take it over. Another of the condottieri, Gianpaolo Baglioni, and the rest of his family left Perugia in advance of Cesare's troops as well. Pandolfo Petrucci, who had been involved in the conspiracy against Cesare, was exiled from Siena at the end of January at Cesare's insistence.
Pandolfo was the ®rst of those driven into exile by Cesare Borgia to go back, after only two months; Louis XII had made it clear that he did not want Siena disturbed. All the others or their heirs returned too, after the fall of Cesare Borgia, except for the Riario. The return of Francesco Manfredi (who took the name of Astorre) to Faenza and of Pandolfo Malatesta to Rimini was brief, as they were soon forced out by the Venetians, who wanted those towns for themselves. Giulio Cesare Varano had been killed during the conquest of his state, but his family recovered the signoria. The Baglioni, Vitelli, Sforza da Pesaro, Montefeltro, d'Appiano and della Rovere all returned without dif®-culty.
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Other victims of the ambitions of Alexander for his family were members of the major Roman baronial families. The Caetani, the weakest of the major clans, were the ®rst to be dispossessed in 1500. The Colonna and Savelli lost their lands in 1501, after they were weakened by their involvement in the defeat of Federico of Naples. The Orsini lost most of their estates in 1503, as Alexander and Cesare Borgia took their revenge for their involvement in the conspiracy against Cesare in 1502. Most of the con®scated estates were granted or sold to members of the Borgia family, but were recovered by the barons soon after Alexander's death.
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In that Alexander's aim in dispossessing the barons was to destroy their power and replace them by his own relatives, the barons could be regarded as falling into the ®rst major category of exiles. In the extent of their control and jurisdiction over those who lived on their estates, and in their independence of papal authority, the Roman barons were indeed more like the signori of the Romagna than mere landowners. From another angle, they could be regarded as falling into the second major category of exiles, the opponents of princely and signorial families. After the conspiracy against Cesare Borgia, the Orsini could certainly be so regarded by the pope.
The barons did not challenge the pope for control of Rome, but they were still powerful enough to cause him considerable trouble. Those who continued to behave as if they were a law unto themselves, such as Everso d'Anguillara, were liable to ®nd that their de®ance brought retribution. Everso was fortunate enough to die before he could be called to account, but his sons Deifebo and Francesco, who set out to continue in their father's ways, soon found that Paul II would not tolerate such behaviour. All their lands and strongholds were captured within the space of three months in 1465. Francesco was captured and imprisoned in the Castel Sant'Angelo in Rome, while Deifebo escaped into exile.
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Those barons who recognized that times had changed could still be very threatening to the pope, especially if they served as the condottieri of other Italian powers who were at war with him, and put their estates near Rome at the disposal of their employers. Prospero and Fabrizio Colonna did this when Sixtus IV was at war with Ferrante of Naples in 1482 in the early months of the War of Ferrara. In October 1482, several of the Colonna were publicly proclaimed on the Campidoglio to be outlaws (sbanditi). 32 If they clashed with the popes, the barons could be excommunicated, anathematized or declared rebels; but they were rarely sentenced to exile. There was indeed little point in declaring the barons to be formally exiled from Rome, as most of them were seldom there, spending their time on their estates or serving as condottieri.
Another group of sometimes powerful individuals, potential challengers to the authority of the popes ± the cardinals ± were not sent into exile from Rome either. Except for a few who had been created cardinals largely because they were already important ®gures in their own country, the cardinals were generally expected to be resident in Rome. For most cardinals, not to be usually resident in Rome was tantamount to opposition to the pope, or at least an implicitly critical stance towards him. The popes preferred to keep even their critics and opponents within the College of Cardinals in Rome, where they could keep an eye on them. Dissident cardinals outside Rome could provide the means for a secular ruler at odds with the pope to call a general council of the Church, and force the pope to battle to preserve his authority.
During the ponti®cate of Alexander VI, several cardinals went into self-exile from Rome. One did not need to believe all the gossip about Alexander and his family that formed the stuff of later legends about the Borgia in order to feel safer out of his reach once he had marked you down as an enemy. Some of the cardinals who left were caught up in the persecution of their families. Cardinal Giovanni Colonna left Rome for his family estates in 1499; after Alexander con®scated the Colonna lands in 1501, he thought it safer to spend the rest of the ponti®cate in Sicily. When Cesare Borgia set out to capture Imola and Forlõ Á, Cardinal Raffaele Riario, nephew of Girolamo, felt that he would be safer in France. 33 Other cardinals exiled themselves from Alexander's Rome because they disapproved of him or his policies. Most dangerous of all was an early exile, Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal San Pietro ad Vincula. One of the most powerful ®gures in Rome, he did not trust the pope at all, and openly quarrelled with him, going to stay in his fortress at Ostia on the mouth of the Tiber. In late April 1494, he left Ostia by ship for France. There he joined the Neapolitan exiles in urging Charles VIII to take his army to Italy; he wanted Charles to go to Rome in force and call for a general council of the Church to depose Alexander.
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Few others were exiled from Rome for challenging the authority of the pope. One was Stefano Porcaro, exiled by Nicholas V after Porcaro had made a number of in¯ammatory speeches. Porcaro came back clandestinely in 1453, and conspired with members of his family to restore republican government to Rome, killing the pope and cardinals if need be. The conspiracy was discovered, and Porcaro was arrested and hanged.
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Elsewhere in the Papal States, it was not so much opponents of the pope that were banished, as the opponents of local signorial and dominant families. At Forlõ Á, for example, there was a series of conspiracies against Girolamo Riario by partisans of the Ordelaf®. The chronicler Bernardi recorded ®ve conspiracies and counted over 68 individuals outlawed (banditi) and 24 exiled between 1480 and 1487 for plotting against Riario. 36 The conspiracy which ®nally led to Girolamo Riario's death in April 1488 was not, however, one in which the Ordelaf® were involved; the members of the Orsi family who planned and executed the assassination had personal grievances against Riario. Seventeen of those involved in the conspiracy managed to escape into exile, including Lodovico and Checco Orsi and their sons, but their father Andrea was one of those executed in Caterina Sforza's bloody revenge. About thirty others were sent into exile by Caterina, mostly to Imola.
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In Bologna, Giovanni II Bentivoglio succeeded in 1463 to a position of pre-eminence that had been hard won by three generations of his family, but that still had little of®cial underpinning. He told a Milanese envoy that he lived in constant anxiety lest he should be exiled, and that all his efforts were directed towards avoiding this fate. 38 Within the inner circle of power, some of the Malvezzi family, who had helped the Bentivoglio against their enemies and rivals, were envious, and they were becoming estranged. On 27 November 1488, a plot to murder Giovanni Bentivoglio and his family, take over the palace of the Anziani and change the regime in Bologna was discovered. The principal conspirators were Giulio Malvezzi and four sons of Battista Malvezzi. Some other younger Malvezzi were involved, but it was widely believed that Battista himself and his three other sons were not. This did not save Battista from being exiled with his immediate family. Of his four sons who had been involved in the conspiracy, two, Girolamo and Filippo, escaped from Bologna. Giulio Malvezzi was also exiled, as were several other members of the family. Not all the Malvezzi were banished, but those who remained felt unwelcome and unsafe. Over the next few years, they gradually left Bologna on their own initiative.
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The Sforza made something of a practice of exiling those who they believed might cause trouble, without necessarily waiting until they made a move ± as Lodovico did with Roberto da Sanseverino and Ascanio. Francesco Sforza aimed to forestall trouble by exiling those citizens who had dominated Milan during the Ambrosian Republic (1447±50) established after the death of Filippo Maria Visconti. A list of forty-four men`sent away' (`mandati fora') after Francesco's accession to the duchy survives, 40 but there was no general prosecution of all who had opposed him.
After the death of Roberto da Sanseverino in the service of Venice in 1487, the most dangerous exiled opponent of Lodovico Sforza was Giangiacomo Trivulzio. One of the leading Guelfs of the duchy, and one of the best Italian generals of his day, Trivulzio had been a loyal servant of the Sforza dukes. Loyal, but outspoken: as Trivulzio's reputation grew, he considered that he had a right to demand due recognition of his worth, and would protest if he felt slighted. Lodovico began to make him feel unwelcome. He did not formally exile him ± Trivulzio gave him no reasonable grounds to do so ± but was happy to agree to his going to Naples to take up an invitation from Alfonso, Duke of Calabria. Trivulzio served Ferrante and Alfonso, and Ferrandino, but when the young Aragonese king was himself preparing to go into exile he released Trivulzio from his service, leaving him free to make terms with the French. Charles appointed him his lieutenant in Italy, based in Asti on the borders of the duchy of Milan, and when Louis succeeded Charles, he con®rmed Trivulzio's appointment. Thus it was that Trivulzio came to lead into Milan the French army that deprived Lodovico Sforza of his duchy. 
